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ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LIABLE
UNDER RULE 10b-5?
TEXTUALISM AND ITS LIMITS
MARGARET V. SACHS*
Whether state and local governments can be sued for damages is a
question that cuts across subject-area boundaries. This question, which
has long confounded courts in the areas of both antitrust' and civil
rights2 law, now has arisen in a new area: section 10(b)3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19344 and rule 10b-5.5
That this question should emerge under rule lOb-5 is hardly surpris-
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1973 Harvard University;
J.D. 1977 Harvard Law School. The author wishes to express her appreciation to Lynne L. Dallas,
Robert W. Hillman, Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Robert C. Power, and Camilla E. Watson for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
I. The Supreme Court has held that local governments may be sued under the antitrust laws.
See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The local government
can avoid liability, however, when it acted pursuant to state policy, thereby entitling it to the anti-
trust immunity accorded a state acting in its sovereign capacity. See id. at 413. See also City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1356 (1991) (attributing state's im-
munity to local government); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (same).
Moreover, Congress has immunized local governments from liability for damages under the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
2. The Supreme Court has held that local governments may be sued under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) [hereinafter § 1983]. See Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Local governments can be held liable only for official poli-
cies, however, and not simply for the acts of their employees. See id. at 690-92. See also City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989) (addressing circumstances under which inadequate
police training can constitute a policy); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (a
policy can be set only by those with final decisionmaking authority).
3. Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) [hereinafter § 10(b)].
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(l1) (1988) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
5. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942,
provides:
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ing. Faced with cuts in federal aid, state and local governments6 issued
twice the volume of securities in 1990 as in 1980.7 Fraud litigation in-
volving these securities has been brought against not only brokers, deal-
ers, and other private actors,' but also the governments themselves.9
Such litigation against governments is bound to swell. Indeed, a new
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991) [hereinafter rule lOb-5].
Neither rule lOb-5 nor § 10(b) expressly creates a private right of action. See supra notes 3 & 5.
Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), however, lower
federal courts implied a private action for violations of the rule. By 1969, 10 of the 11 United States
courts of appeals had done so. See 6 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73 (2d ed. Supp.
1969) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court first recognized a private right of action under rule
lOb-5 in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). For
a discussion of the Supreme Court's rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, see Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance
of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L.
REv. 96 (1985).
6. Securities are issued by states, by their local governmental units such as cities and towns,
and by their instrumentalities such as public utility districts. Collectively, these are known as "mu-
nicipal securities." See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (1988); II Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1159 (3d ed. 1989). This Article focuses solely on the liability of local
governments and therefore avoids use of the terms "municipalities" and "municipal securities,"
which include states and state government securities. The Article refers instead to local govern-
ments and local government securities and, when appropriate, to states and state government securi-
ties. This Article does not address the liability of the United States under the federal securities laws.
See generally id. at 1158-59.
7. In 1980, state and local governments issued slightly more than $76 billion worth of short-
and long-term securities. See PUBLIC SECURITIES ASS'N, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 3
(4th ed. 1990). In 1990, the figure was slightly more than $162 billion. See Projected Volume Totals
for 1991 Compared to Actual 1990 Issuance, MUN. MARKET DEVS., Feb. 11, 1991, at 2.
8. See, eg., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 196 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendants
include underwriters, dealers, accountants, and attorneys); Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., [1989-90
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,996, at 95,574 (D. Mass. March 6, 1990) (defendants
include underwriters, and corporate officers and directors); In re New York City Mun. See. Litig.,
507 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendants include underwriters and sellers).
9. See, eg., Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 1003 (11th Cir.) (defendants include
City of Vestavia Hills), aff'd on other grounds, 885 F.2d 723, 728 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(appeal dismissed as to Vestavia Hills), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990); Gorsey, 1 94,996 at
95,577 (defendants include City of South Bend, Indiana); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.
Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1395 (D. Ariz. 1989) (approving settlements by, inter alia, Seattle,
and Richland, Washington).
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SEC rule on offerings of state and local government securities mandates
that disclosure documents prepared by the issuing government be distrib-
uted to investors.10 In any fraud action involving these documents, the
SEC regards the government as the appropriate defendant."1 In addition,
many local government issuers are widely thought to be on the verge of
default,' 2 a fact undoubtedly conducive to rule lOb-5 actions. Finally,
issuance of government securities is not essential to governmental liabil-
ity under rule lOb-5. Claims that governments participated in fraud in-
volving ordinary corporate securities are by no means unknown. 3
While state governments have avoided liability under rule lOb-5 on the
basis of the Eleventh Amendment,' 4 local governments have fared less
well. Lower federal courts' 5 have found rule lOb-5 applicable to New
10. Rule 15c2-12, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (1991) [hereinafter rule 15c2-12]. Rule 15c2-12
became effective on January 1, 1990. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 26985, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,098, at 18,190 (June 28, 1989) [hereinafter
Municipal Disclosure Release]. Rule 15c2-12 applies to primary offerings of state and local govern-
ment securities exceeding $1 million. See rule 15c2-12(a). There are in addition certain limited
exemptions. See rule 15c2-12(c). The rule places the burden of distribution on the underwriter. See
rule 15c2-12(b)(2). The documents distributed are prepared by the issuing government, however.
See rule 15c2-12(b)(1).
11. In its release announcing rule 15c2-12, the SEC stated that "[a]lthough the focus of the
Commission's interpretation was on underwriter practices, issuers are primarily responsible for the
content of their disclosure documents and may be held liable under the federal securities laws for
misleading disclosure." Municipal Disclosure Release, supra note 10, at 18,199-10 n.84 (cases omit-
ted). The SEC did not address the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on the fraud liability of state
issuers. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
12. See, e-g., Constance Mitchell, Fear of Big Defaults Roils Muni Markets, WALL ST. J., May
17, 1991, at Cl.
13. See, eg., In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (claim
made against New York City).
14. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The amendment is read to prevent a citizen from suing his own state in federal court.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
For illustrative cases dismissing state governments as defendants in securities actions on the basis
of the Eleventh Amendment, see Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1988); Charter Oak Fed. Say.
Bank v. Ohio, 666 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ohio 1987). But cf. Finkielstain v. Seidel, 857 F.2d 893 (2d
Cir. 1988) (Eleventh Amendment inapplicable to state sued in its capacity as receiver rather than in
its sovereign capacity); In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,951, at 94,655 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1986) (Eleventh Amendment inapplicable to
state defendants who issued securities but applicable to other state defendants).
15. State courts have been thought to lack jurisdiction over private rule lOb-5 litigation in
accordance with the 1934 Act's exclusive jurisdictional grant in § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). For
the argument that § 27 does not govern private rule lob-5 actions, see Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive
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York City,16 South Bend, Indiana,17 Vestavia Hills, Alabama,' I nine cit-
ies in Washington,19 and five cities in Idaho,2" as well as to numerous
local government officials acting in their official capacities.21
Determining whether section 10(b) applies to local governments re-
quires analysis of not only the 1934 Act but also the closely related Se-
curities Act of 1933.22 The 1933 Act is principally directed at the initial
distribution of securities, while the 1934 Act concentrates on the secon-
dary markets. 23 Despite their different emphases, the two acts employ
similar regulatory mechanisms. Each act requires registration of securi-
ties24 and each imposes liability for fraud.25 In addition, each act pro-
vides an exemption from registration for state and local government
securities. 26 These registration exemptions, however, are irrelevant to
Federal Jurisdiction for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
559 (1988).
16. See In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1072-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
17. See Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,173
(D. Mass. Feb. 23, 1987). See also Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,996 (D. Mass. March 6, 1990).
18. See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 1003 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
885 F.2d 723, 728 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (appeal dismissed as to Vestavia Hills), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990).
19. See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466, 1476 n.4,
1478-80 (W.D. Wash. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
20. See id.
21. See, eg., In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. at 1072-75; In re Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. at 1476 n.4, 1478-80. Suing an official acting in her
official capacity is the same as suing the government for which she works. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(mm) (1988) [hereinafter 1933 Act]. The legisla-
tive history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is assembled in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds.,
1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A] and in FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS-LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1933-82 (Federal Bar Ass'n See. Law Comm. ed., 1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY B].
23. For an overview of the federal securities statutes, see Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 35-39 (2d ed. 1988).
24. The 1933 Act requires registration of all offerings of securities in interstate commerce un-
less an exemption applies. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988). As originally enacted, the 1934 Act re-
quired registration of all securities listed on national securities exchanges in the absence of an
applicable exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988). In 1964, Congress extended 1934 Act registra-
tion to the over-the-counter markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1988). Securities registered under the
1934 Act are subject to a periodic reporting requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
25. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
26. The 1933 Act lists classes of securities that are exempted from the regulation "[e]xcept as
hereinafter expressly provided." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1988). Included in the list are state and local
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section 10(b) and its 1933 Act analog, section 17(a).27 Sections 10(b) and
17(a) apply to fraud involving state and local government securities,2"
independent of the question of whether governments themselves are ap-
propriate defendants. Yet section 10(b) is of far greater moment to local
governments than is section 17(a), since under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 a private action is "beyond peradventure,' ' 29 whereas under section
17(a) a private action is now widely rejected.30
There are at present two rationales for applying section 10(b)-which
government securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1988). The section of the act requiring registra-
tion does not countermand the exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988).
In contrast to the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act does not contain a comprehensive exemption provision.
It does, however, define "exempted securities" to include "municipal securities," 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(12)(AXii) (1988), a category that includes both state and local government securities. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(29) (1988). It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether a given section excludes ex-
empted securities. The provisions mandating registration do so expressly. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(a),(g) (1988).
27. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988) [hereinafter section 17(a)].
28. Section 17(a)'s application to local government securities is clear from § 17(c), which states
that "[t]he exemptions provided in section 77c of this title [1933 Act § 3] shall not apply to the
provisions of this section." 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1988). The same conclusion follows for § 10(b),
which prohibits the use of any "manipulative or deceptive device" in connection with the purchase
or sale of "any security" and makes no reference to "exempted securities." For the text of § 10(b),
see supra note 3.
The other 1933 and 1934 Act fraud provisions do not apply to local government securities. Sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act applies only to offerings of registered securities, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), and
local government securities are exempt from registration under the 1933 Act. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(2) (1988), applies to fraud in
documents filed with the SEC, and the 1934 Act exempts local government securities from registra-
tion. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1)(2)
(1988), by its terms does not apply to securities exempted under § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)
(1988). which includes state and local government securities. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e) (1988), expressly does not apply to exempted securities by the terms of §§ 9(a) and (f), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(a),(f) (1988).
29. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
30. See, eg., Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1989); Newcome v.
Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1101 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d
780, 784-85 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349,
1354 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986);
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by its terms applies to any "person"-31-to local governments. 32 In the
view of the SEC and certain commentators, section 10(b) has applied to
local governments since 1934,33 despite Congress' failure to include gov-
ernments in the original 1934 Act definition of "person. ' 34 They base
their view on the 1933 Act's definition of "person," in which govern-
ments were always expressly incorporated. 31 Without examining the leg-
islative history,36 they conclude that the discrepancy between the two
acts could have no rational explanation and that the omission of govern-
ments from the 1934 Act definition should therefore be disregarded.37
Other commentators and a number of lower courts adhere to the very
different view that section 10(b) has applied to local governments only
since 1975.38 Proponents of this view emphasize the text of the 1934
Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 1982). But cf. Ronzani v. Sanofi,
S.A., 899 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1990) (leaving question open).
31. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 3.
32. Because rule lOb-5 does not provide its own definition of "person," the statutory definition
controls. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-1(b) (1991).
33. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,876, [1975-76, Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 80,333, at 85,826-34 (Nov. 26, 1975) [hereinafter Release No. ll,876](discussing
rule lOb-5's application prior to the then newly enacted 1975 amendments). See also Thomas P.
Peacock, A Review of Municipal Securities and Their Status Under the Federal Securities Laws As
Amended by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 31 Bus. LAW 2037, 2043 (1975); Victor M.
Rosenzweig, Municipal Securities and the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 4 SEc.
REG. L.J. 135, 141 (1976); Michael D. Jones, Comment, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities:
A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1265; Note, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities: Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 86 YALE L.J. 919, 927 (1977).
34. Section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act originally defined "person" as "an individual, a corporation,
a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organi-
zation." 1934 Act, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 883, reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note
22, item 1 at 883.
35. Section 2(2) of the 1933 Act defined "person" as "an individual, a corporation, a partner-
ship, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a govern-
ment or political subdivision thereof." 1933 Act, Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISToRY A, supra note 22, item 1 at 74 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1988)).
36. Lower federal courts deciding securities cases frequently overlook the legislative history.
See, eg., Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional
Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 680 (1990).
37. The SEC does not articulate the basis for its position that § 10(b) always has reached local
governments. See Release No. 11,876, supra note 33. Commentators who share this view strongly
imply that they do so because the 1933 Act always authorized such a reach. See Peacock, supra note
33, at 2043; Jones, supra note 33, at 1264-65; Robert Dudley Tuke, Note, Disclosure by Issuers of
Municipal Securities: An Analysis of Recent Proposals and a Suggested Approach, 29 VAND. L. REV.
1017, 1019 n.14 (1976).
38. See Robert W. Doty & John E. Peterson, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in
Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 294 n.56 (1976); Jon R. Tandler, MunicipalAntifraud
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws Upon Issuance of Tax-Exempt Industrial Development
[Vol. 70:19
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Act's 1975 amendments,39 which added to the definition of "person" "a
government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a gov-
ernment."'  Ignoring the legislative history of those amendments, they
reason that since section 10(b) embraces any "person" and a "person"
has included a government since 1975, section 10(b) has been applicable
to local governments since that time.4"
The thesis of this Article is that a local government is an inappropriate
rule lOb-5 defendant, regardless of whether it is the issuer of the securi-
ties in question or an alleged participant in a scheme involving corporate
securities.42  The only appropriate rule lOb-5 defendants are private
actors.43
Part I demonstrates that legislative history and statutory purpose are
essential to resolving the question of section 10(b)'s applicability to local
governments, the current arguments in favor of a textual approach to
statutory interpretation notwithstanding." The question implicates two
lines of cases in which the Supreme Court for valid reasons has accorded
Bonds, 24 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 193, 199 (1983). For illustrative cases, see In re
Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. at 1072-75; In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys Sea
Litig., 623 F. Supp. at 1478-80.
39. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in various
sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1975 amendments].
40. Id. at 97, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note 22, item 136 at 2257 (cur-
rently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1988)).
41. See cases and commentators cited supra note 38.
42. Virtually all of the commentary takes the position that local governments are appropriate
rule lOb-5 defendants. See Doty & Peterson, supra note 38, at 294 n.56; Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory
Disclosurefor Municipal Securities Issues in Implementation, 13 J. CORP. L. 65, 67 (1987); Peacock,
supra note 33, at 2043; Rosenzweig, supra note 33, at 141; Joel Seligman, The Municipal Disclosure
Debate, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 647, 650 (1984); Marc I. Steinberg, Municipal Issuer Liability Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 6 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-80 (1981); Tandler, supra note 38, at 199; David L.
Butler, Comment, The Liability of Issuers of Municipal Securities, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 551 (1979);
June Rose, Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability and Municipal Issues." Implications of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1064, 1070 (1977); Jones, supra note 33, at 1265;
Tuke, supra note 37, at 1019; Note, supra note 33, at 927. But cf. Thomas J. Schwarz, Municipal
Bonds and the Securities Laws Do Investors Have an Implied Remedy?, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 119 (1979)
(finding local governments subject to § 10(b) but rejecting an implied right of action on behalf of
municipal investors).
43. For illustrative cases in which private actors were named as defendants, see supra note 8.
44. For analyses of the textualist movement, see William V. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1299-1335
(1990). The chief exponent of this view on the Supreme Court is Justice Scalia. See generally
Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1663 (1991).
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legislative history and purpose a crucial role: federal securities cases and
cases involving the liability of local governments under federal statutes.
Part II challenges the view that local governments have been subject to
section 10(b) since 1934. Congress deliberately made section 10(b) inap-
plicable to local governments to avoid the consequent interplay with the
contemporaneously enacted municipal bankruptcy statute.45 Part II
then explains why these consequences nonetheless did not prompt Con-
gress to remove local governments from the definition of "person" under
the 1933 Act.
Part III demonstrates the conflict between the text and history of the
1975 amendments. While the text reclassified a government as a "per-
son," the legislative history effectively disclaimed any intent to tamper
with governmental liability for fraud. Those courts and commentators
who assume that local governments are appropriate rule lOb-5 defend-
ants because they are now "persons" have an obligation to come to terms
with this history.
Part IV proposes a reconciliation of the text and history of the 1975
amendments that explains why governments are "persons" on the one
hand but retain their immunity from fraud liability on the other. Con-
gress intended the 1975 amendments to regulate professionals dealing in
state and local government securities, and the reclassification of govern-
ments as "persons" facilitated suits against these professionals. Part IV
concludes by considering arguments that run counter to this new inter-
pretation, finding none of them to be persuasive.46
I. SECTION 10(b) AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY PURPOSE
The question of section 10(b)'s applicability to local governments im-
plicates two lines of cases: federal securities cases and cases involving the
liability of local governments under federal statutes. In each, well-estab-
45. Provisions for the Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors and to Preserve
the Assets Thereof and for Other Related Purposes, Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798
[hereinafter municipal bankruptcy statute].
46. Were courts to hold local governments immune from liability under rule lOb-5, Congress
might well wish to reassess the judgments it made in 1934 and 1975. The thesis of this Article,
however, is that this reassessment is for Congress to make on the basis of a thorough legislative study
of the problem that balances the interests of investors with those of local governments. Treatment of
these policy considerations is beyond the scope of this Article.
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lished jurisprudence accords considerable weight to legislative history
and purpose in matters of statutory interpretation.
A. Federal Securities Cases
Numerous Supreme Court decisions stress that the federal securities
laws must be understood in light of their legislative history and purpose.
As the Court recently held in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 47 the statutory
language "should not be interpreted... literally.., but must be under-
stood against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to accom-
plish in enacting the Securities Acts."48 Accordingly, the Court has
conformed its rulings to legislative history and purpose even when the
statutory text alone might suggest a different outcome. The decisions in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,49 Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. ,o and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc. 51 are illustrative.
In Forman, the Court held that stock in a housing cooperative did not
constitute a "security" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Although the def-
inition of "security" under both acts expressly included stock,52 the
Court ruled that this was not dispositive: "Congress intended the appli-
cation of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." 3 Since the text set
forth no economic criteria by which to identify a security,54 the Court
47. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
48. Id. at 950. (footnote omitted) (interpreting the term "any note"). The Supreme Court has
announced its eschewal of literalism in securities cases many times. Thus, for example, in Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986), it held that "if the language of a provision of the securities laws is
sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary to examine
the additional considerations of 'policy'... that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formu-
lation of the statute." Id. at 656 (quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded)). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 122-23 (1978) (pointing to absence of legislative history
that would countermand statutory language); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473
(1977) (same).
49. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
50. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
51. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
52. See § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988); § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(l0) (1988).
53. Forman, 421 U.S. at 849. The Court also noted that "a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." Id. (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
54. Id. at 847.
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drew on the "the background of [the statutory] purpose,"55 finding piv-
otal "the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others."56 Guided by this "touchstone, '5 7 the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend the statutory protections
to apply to the housing cooperative in question.58
In Kern, the Court held that a transaction arguably falling within the
common-sense meaning of "sale" 59 nonetheless was not a "sale" under
the 1934 Act provision prohibiting short-swing profits.' Eschewing a
literal reading of the text, the Court sought guidance from the underlying
statutory purpose.61 The Court concluded that the provision prohibited
transactions that "may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress
sought to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits based upon ac-
cess to inside information." 62
In Capital Gains, the Court held that conduct could constitute "fraud
or deceit" under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act 63 even ab-
sent a showing of scienter. Acknowledging that scienter is a necessary
element of fraud and deceit "in their technical sense," 6 the Court none-
theless ruled a lack of scienter not dispositive. What mattered was the
"history and purpose of the Investment Advisers Act,"65 which, the
Court concluded, did not support a scienter requirement.66
55. Id. at 849.
56. Id. at 852.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 859. Similarly, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), the Supreme Court
did not quarrel with the lower court's conclusion that the agreement in question was literally "a
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement," a phrase included in the defini-
tion of a security. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10) (1988). The Court nonetheless reversed the lower
court and held that the agreement was not a security. See 455 U.S. at 559-60.
59. At issue in Kern were sales by a defeated tender offeror (Occidental) of the stock of the
target company (Old Kern), which had merged into a third company (Tenneco). The merger agree-
ment entitled Occidental to exchange its shares of Old Kern for shares of Tenneco. Occidental
entered into an agreement with Tenneco that conferred an option to purchase Occidental's Tenneco
shares obtained pursuant to the merger agreement. Tenneco subsequently exercised this option. See
Kern County Land Co., 411 U.S. at 584-91.
60. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7gp(b) (1988).
61. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U.S. at 593-95.
62. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).
63. Investment Advisors Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988).
64. Capital Gains Research Bureau, In., 375 U.S. at 185.
65. Id. at 186. The discussion of this history and purpose occupies 15 pages. See id. at 186-
201.
66. Id. at 200-01. For illustrative additional cases relying on legislative history and statutory
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Three factors have led the Court to rely heavily on legislative history
and purpose in these cases. First, it is essentially impossible to focus
exclusively on the text when the text itself directs otherwise.67 Key terms
in the federal securities laws-such as "security,"6 "issuer," 69 "under-
writer,"7 and "prospectus," 7 -apply "unless the context otherwise re-
quires."72 While at a minimum "context" embraces the text of the
specific provision in question,73 the Supreme Court and commentators
have construed it to reach further and to encompass the facts of the
transaction in question,74 the purpose of the provision in question,75 and
purpose, see Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 645 n.22 (1988) (finding support for interpretation of § 12
of the 1933 Act in Congress' rejection of a proposed amendment); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 245 (1988) (finding interpretation of reliance requirement supported by 1934 Act policy); Ran-
dall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663-64 (1986) (looking to congressional purpose to determine
meaning of "actual damages" in § 28(a) of the 1934 Act); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315-17 (1985) (denial of the in pari delicto defense in the case would further
policies important to Congress); Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (using
legislative history and statutory purpose to interpret § 14(e) of the 1934 Act); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06, 214 n.33 (1976) (relying on legislative history to establish scienter
requirement under § 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732, 737-49
(1975) (relying on legislative history and statutory policy to uphold purchaser-seller requirement
under § 10(b)); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971)
(using legislative history and statuory purpose to determine scope of § 10(b)).
67. Some constitutional scholars make the analogous point that the framers intended that their
original intent be disregarded. See Robert C. Power, The Textualist, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 711, 733 &
n.138 (1990) (book review) (collecting authorities).
68. See § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988); § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1988).
69. See § 2(4) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(4) (1988); § 3(a)(8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(aX8) (1988).
70. See § 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988).
71. See § 2(10) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988).
72. The 1933 Act prefaces its definition provisions with the language: "when used in this sub-
chapter, unless the context otherwise requires." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1988). The 1934 Act prefaces
its definitions the same way, substituting "chapter" for "subchapter." See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1988).
73. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (construing the phrase "unless the
context otherwise requires" to mean that "Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may
take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws"); II Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 6, at 873; Mark I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Defini-
tion of "Security'" The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications,
40 VAND. L. REv. 489, 504 (1987).
74. See, eg., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) (noting that "the
context of the transaction involved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind of
context to which the Acts normally apply"); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.l1 (1982)
(whether an instrument is a security turns on "the content of the instruments in question, the pur-
poses intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole"); II Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6,
at 874 (finding support in legislative history and Supreme Court precedent for examining the factual
context). But see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 73, at 504 (finding no support in the legislative
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the wider legal context of other federal statutes.76 Construed in these
ways, the "context" clause renders the definitions of key terms inoper-
able without consideration of factors outside the text of the statute. In
addition, the text omits altogether definitions of other crucial terms such
as "seller 77 and a transaction "not involving any public offering,' ' 7s nec-
essarily diverting attention to other sources.
Second, legislative history is a particularly dependable guide when the
circumstances of enactment reduce the likelihood that members of Con-
gress are functioning simply as mouthpieces for special interest groups.79
The federal securities laws were enacted as emergency legislation at a
time of national crisis."0 History and logic suggest that legislators were
unusually attentive to the national interest and that their pronounce-
ments tended to reflect their own policy choices.
Third, the value of legislative history is inevitably a function of the
abilities of the drafters and proponents of the legislation. The drafters of
the federal securities laws were highly atypical, consisting mainly of a
cadre of extraordinarily able lawyers recruited by (then Professor) Felix
Frankfurter."1 They provided comprehensive and undoubtedly influen-
history for examining the factual context, but acknowledging Supreme Court precedent to this
effect).
75. See, eg., National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 467. See also Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note
73, at 507.
76. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-59 (consideration of federal banking laws); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979) (consideration of ERISA); Steinberg &
Kaulbach, supra note 73, at 507.
77. Sellers of securities are subject to liability under § 12 of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, however, "the Securities Act nowhere delineates who may
be regarded as a statutory seller." Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642 (1988).
78. This is the language of§ 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988), popularly known as
the private-offering exemption. As the Supreme Court has noted, the 1933 Act does not set forth the
boundaries of this exemption. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953).
79. Some scholars argue that the text of a statute constitutes a deal struck between Congress
and special interest groups. If legislative history is taken into account, these scholars contend, the
special interest groups in question may get a deal better than that for which they and Congress
bargained. See Zeppos, supra note 44, at 1304-05 (discussing the problem and collecting
authorities).
80. For a discussion of the historical context of enactment, see I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
6, at 168-71.
81. These drafters were Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, and James Landis. See James M.
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1959).
See also 77 CONG. REc. 2916, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 7 at
2916 (Rep. Rayburn) (listing drafters of 1933 Act as including Cohen, Landis, and Felix Frank-
furter); "Stock Exchange Regulation," Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Act House
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tial testimony throughout the hearings,82 and the Supreme Court has
quoted and parsed their statements 3 in apparent disregard of the fact
that they did not hold elective office.84
Thus, legislative history in federal securities cases is important because
of the nature of the statutory text, the high caliber of the drafters who
testified at the hearings, and the depolitization of the enactment process
that resulted from the economic crisis of the early 1930s. One final factor
provides additional reinforcement: the legislative history is easily acces-
sible in multiple competing compilations,85 powerful evidence in itself of
the history's significance.
B. The Liability of Local Governments Under Federal Statutes
The Supreme Court has already confronted the issue of local govern-
ment liability under the antitrust 86 and civil rights8 7 laws. Like the se-
curities decisions, antitrust and civil rights decisions accord legislative
history an important role, even in the face of seemingly clear statutory
language. Exemplifying this approach is the leading decision under each
statute holding local governments subject to suit. In City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Light & Power Co. ,8 the Court focused principally on policy
considerations underlying the antitrust laws that might warrant immu-
nity for local governments despite the textual support for liability. 9 In
Hearings], reprinted in 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 23 at 83 (statement of
Thomas Corcoran) (listing drafters of the 1934 Act as including Landis, Corcoran, and Cohen).
82. See, e.g., infra notes 149, 154, 169, 171 and accompanying text.
83. See, eg., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976) (relying on statements
of Thomas Corcoran); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 246-49 (1976)
(same).
84. Some scholars who reject legislative history as a guide to statutory interpretation argue that
committee reports are written by congressional staff rather than by members of Congress. See Zep-
pos, supra note 44, at 1311-13 (discussing the argument and noting that the same can be said for the
text of the bill).
85. See supra note 22. See also 11, Pts. 2-2C, HUGH L. SOWARDS, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933-PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL; 1 IA, Pts. 2-2F, EDWARD N. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURI-
TIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL.
86. For illustrative cases, see supra note 1.
87. For illustrative cases, see supra note 2.
88. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
89. The Lafayette Court made plain early in its opinion that statutory language was not alone
dispositive: "the conclusion that the antitrust laws are not to be construed... to subject cities to
liability... must rest on the impact of some overriding public policy which negates the construction
of coverage." Id. at 397. For a discussion of the textual support for liability, see id. at 394-95. See
also infra note 217.
1992]
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Monell v. Department of Social Services,9  the Court upheld the liability
of local governments under section 1983 entirely on the basis of legisla-
tive history and statutory policy.91 Moreover, in later decisions refining
the contours of local government liability under the antitrust and civil
rights laws, the Court continues to base its analysis on considerations of
history and purpose rather than confining itself to the statutory text.92 :
The Court's approach in these cases may at least in part be the result
of factors peculiar to the antitrust and civil rights laws.93 Two additional
factors are, however, probably also at work in cases involving local gov-
ernment liability under federal statutes.
The first is the principle of federalism, which provides that the federal
government will not encroach unnecessarily on state governments in the
course of safeguarding federal interests.94 To be sure, local governments
do not possess the sovereignty of states under the Constitution.9" Yet
local and state governments are not always fully segregable, since local
governments implement state policy.96 Thus, as a means of avoiding fed-
eral-state conflicts, the Court does not rest with a textual analysis of the
federal statute at issue, but asks whether legislative history and policy
confirm that regulation of local governments was intended.
The second factor involves practicalities. As the Court has acknowl-
edged, albeit in the limited context of punitive damages, a money judg-
ment can create financial hardship for a local government, with its
citizenry the ultimate victims.97 Before subjecting local governments and
their citizens to this hazard, the Court has determined whether legislative
history and policy reflect a clear congressional choice in favor of regula-
tion.98 The Court no doubt will be similarly protective of local govern-
90. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
91. See id. at 665-89.
92. See, ag., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986) (§ 1983); Jefferson
County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Lab., 460 U.S. 150, 157-62 (1983) (antitrust); Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (§ 1983).
93. See, eg., Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuxE L.J. 160, 168 & n.35 (legislative history
carries special significance when a statute is so old that the meaning of words in the text may have
shifted over time).
94. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
95. See, eg., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985).
96. See, eg., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Il1 S. Ct. 1344, 1349
(1991).
97. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981).
98. See id. at 267.
[Vol. 70:19
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/2
1992] LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY UNDER RULE lOb-5
ments even when only compensatory damages are at issue. Such
protectiveness would appear to represent the will of Congress, which in
the area of antitrust has granted local governments immunity from ac-
tions not only for treble damages, but for any and all damages.99
In short, in both the federal securities cases and cases involving the
liability of local governments under federal statutes, the Supreme Court
has found nontextual sources essential to its analysis. The question of
section 10(b)'s applicability to local governments partakes of both lines
of cases. The necessity for considering legislative history and purpose
thus is doubly compelling.
II. SECTION 10(b) AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 1934: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE
Determining whether section 10(b) applies to local governments re-
quires analysis of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Some brief background
concerning the two acts as they stood in 1934 is therefore in order.
The 1933 Act was principally directed at initial offerings of securi-
ties.1°° It required registration of such offerings through the filing of a
detailed disclosure document known as a registration statement.101 Cer-
tain categories of securities-including securities issued by state and local
governments-were exempt from the registration requirement 0 2 on the
theory that their relative safety made such regulation unnecessary.10 3
Exempted securities were not thought to be absolutely safe, however, and
hence they fell within the ambit of section 17(a), 1" an anti-fraud prohibi-
tion enforceable by the government.10 5 Moreover, a section 17(a) defend-
ant could be any "person,"" a term defined by the 1933 Act to include a
government.10 7 In contrast to section 17(a), the private fraud remedy
under section 12(2) expressly excluded from its purview state and local
government securities.10 8 This exclusion may have reflected an intent to
99. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988).
100. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
105. For the text of § 17(a), see supra note 27.
106. See id.
107. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In 1933, the constitutionality of subsuming local
governments under § 17(a) was far from clear. See infra note 182.
108. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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shield local governments from the negligence-based private actions au-
thorized by section 12(2),109 or, conceivably, from all private actions.110
The 1934 Act focused on the secondary markets.11' Like the 1933
Act, the 1934 Act contained a registration requirement" 2 and fraud
prohibitions.' 13 Issuers with securities traded on a national securities ex-
change were required to register the security and to file periodic reports
thereafter.1 14 Among the securities exempted from this requirement
were those issued by state and local governments.' Like the 1933 Act,
the 1934 Act contained no private express fraud remedy applicable to
state and local government securities. 1 6 Such securities were, however,
fully subject to section 10(b), 117 the general anti-fraud provision, which,
in tandem with rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder in 1942, authorized
government actions expressly 1 and private actions by implication." 9
Local governments did not appear to be appropriate section 10(b) de-
fendants, however. While section 10(b) applied to any "person," 12 the
term "person" was not defined to include a government under the 1934
Act as originally enacted. 2'
The SEC and certain commentators nonetheless maintain that section
10(b) has applied to local governments since 1934,12 apparently in reli-
ance upon the inclusion of governments ii the definition of "person"
under the 1933 Act.1 23 Believing this discrepancy in definitions could
have no rational explanation, they conclude that the omission of govern-
ments from the 1934 Act definition' 2 4 should be disregarded.,1
Such a position is flatly contradicted by the legislative history, which
109. See Steinberg, supra note 42, at 280 n.15.
110. None of the express private remedies for fraud under the 1933 and 1934 Acts applies to
local government securities. See supra note 28.
111. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
117. See id.
118. For the text of § 10(b) and rule l0b-5, see supra notes 3 and 5 respectively.
119. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 3.
121. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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makes clear that local governments fall outside the scope of section
10(b). To appreciate this point, it is necessary to examine (a) the history
of the definition of "person" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts; (b) the his-
tory of the exemptions for state and local government securities under
both Acts; and (c) the consequences for section 10(b).
A. The Definition of "Person"
There is considerable evidence that Congress fully intended to exclude
governments from the 1934 Act's definition of "person." The issue of
whether a government was a "person" under the 1933 Act, and hence
subject to section 17(a), had been the subject of considerable dispute. A
government was a "person" in the version of the 1933 Act passed by the
House, 126 but not in the version passed by the Senate.1 27 A House-Senate
conference resolved the matter, with the House view prevailing. 128 Thus,
whether governments should be deemed statutory "persons" was, by
1934, already ground well travelled. A clear textual departure in 1934
from this much-debated 1933 choice was almost certainly no accident.
Further evidence of congressional intent to exclude local governments
emerges upon placing the issue in its larger context. Whether a govern-
ment is a "person" subject to a fraud provision is simply one aspect of a
subject to which Congress in 1933 and 1934 devoted considerable atten-
tion: fraud involving securities of state and local governments. The
same 1933 Act joint conference that deemed a government a "person"
also made the private remedy under section 12(2) inapplicable to fraud
involving state and local government securities, regardless of whether the
defendant was a government. 129 And under the 1934 Act, the section
9(e) and 18(a) private remedies likewise did not apply to fraud involving
state or local government securities.1 30 Given the attention Congress
paid to fraud involving these securities, it seems highly unlikely that the
1934 Act's definition of "person" would have excluded government issu-
ers fortuitously.
126. See H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra
note 22, item 26 at 2.
127. See id., item 27 at 40.
128. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 19 at 2.
129. Id. at 26-27.
130. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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B. The Exemptions for State and Local Government Securities
As adopted, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts exempted state and local
government securities from their respective registration provisions.1 31
Yet in considering the 1934 Act, Congress thought seriously about re-
jecting an exemption for such securities, the 1933 Act precedent notwith-
standing.132 This near break in 1934 from the pattern of 1933 illuminates
the actual break between the acts that did occur regarding the definition
of "person." It is thus necessary to turn to the reasons state and local
government securities were exempted from registration under the 1933
Act and to the subsequent events that placed the analogous 1934 Act
exemption in jeopardy.
1. The 1933 Act
The legislative history provides two bases for exempting state and local
government securities. First was lack of necessity. According to the
House Report, the 1933 Act sought only to "prevent recurrences of
demonstrated abuses,"1 33 providing exemptions where "there is no prac-
tical need for [the 1933 Act's] application or where the public benefits are
too remote."13 4 With Senator Reynolds the only announced dissenter in
Congress,13 5 the consensus in 1933 was that state and local government
securities were relatively safe,136 rarely the subject of fraud, 137 and owned
131. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 151-55, 168-69 and accompanying text.
133. H.R. REp. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A,
supra note 22, item 18 at 7.
134. Id at 5.
135. Arguing against the exemption, Senator Reynolds suggested that local governments faced
serious financial problems. "Securities Act Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Banking & Cur-
rency Comm., 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933) [hereinafter 1933 Act Senate Hearings], reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISToRY A, supra note 22, item 21 at 65. A witness questioned by Senator Reynolds
appeared to share that view. See id. (statement of Col. A.H. Carter, President of the New York
State Society of Certified Public Accountants).
136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. See also "Federal Securities Act": Hearings on
H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933)
[hereinafter 1933 Act House Hearings], reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item
20 at 29 (statement of Huston Thompson, former FTC Commissioner); Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1670, HR. 3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5267, and H.R. 5009, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 25 (statement of Rep. Wilcox) [hereinafter House Municipal Bankruptcy Hearing].
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. See also 1933 Act Senate Hearings, supra note
135, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 21 at 232-33 (statement of M.H.
MacLean, bank vice president).
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primarily by sophisticated investors. 138
The second basis involved a constitutional doctrine that enjoyed its
heyday in the early 1930s: state and local government immunity from
federal taxation.1 39 The Supreme Court had inferred a constitutional
mandate to provide state and local governments with insulation from
federal intrusion." The 1933 Act House Report explicitly linked this
doctrine and the registration exemption for state and local government
securities:
The line drawn ... corresponds generally with the line drawn by the courts
as to what obligations of States, their units and instrumentalities created by
them, are exempted from Federal taxation. By such a delineation, any con-
stitutional difficulties that might arise with reference to the inclusion of
State and municipal obligations are avoided. 141
Given the Supreme Court's decisions applying the immunity doctrine in
the tax area, it was distinctly possible that the Court also would strike
down a federal registration requirement for state and local government
securities. Indeed, the Court had invalidated federal taxation in situa-
tions in which the effect on the state or local government was hypotheti-
cal at best. 142 For instance, a state judge's salary was held immune from
federal taxation, 143 as were the proceeds private individuals received
138. Contemporaneous congressional statements of this point can be found in the legislative
history of the municipal bankruptcy statute. See House Municipal Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note
136, at 25 (statement of Rep. Wilcox); 77 CONG. REc. 5471 (1933) (statement of Rep. Foss). See
also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1976) (statement of SEC chairman Roderick M. Hills) (com-
menting on the historical reasons for the exemption for state and local government securities).
The wisdom of exempting state and local government securities from registration has since been
subject to serious challenge. See generally III Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 1162-73.
139. The seminal decision was Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). A number of
cases involving this doctrine were decided on the eve of the 1933 Act's enactment. See, eg., Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.
570 (1931); National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928). In 1939, the Court sharply
curtailed the doctrine. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling
Collector v. Day). For a general review of the doctrine and its decline, see Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 453-60 (1978).
140. See Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 125-26. The doctrine was thought to follow from the Consti-
tution's recognition of states as indispensible units of the federal system. See id. See also Massachu-
setts, 435 U.S. at 455. The doctrine protected local governments as well on the theory that such
governments "are representatives of the States and exercise some of their powers." Indian Motorcy-
cle Co., 283 U.S. at 577. Cf. Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1902).
141. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra
note 22, item 18 at 14.
142. See Indian Motorcycle Co., 283 U.S. at 580 (Stone, J., dissenting).
143. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124.
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from selling a motorcycle to a city for official use'" and from selling
minerals produced from state-owned land to a third party."a These deci-
sions did not turn on the magnitude of anticipated harm to state or local
governments: "Where the principle applies it is not affected by the
amount of the particular tax or the extent of the resulting interference,
but is absolute." '46
Thus, the 1933 Act's exemption from registration for state and local
government securities had both practical and theoretical underpinnings.
These securities were viewed as relatively safe investments, not requiring
the safeguard of registration, and mandatory registration was seen as ar-
guably unconstitutional. 47
2. The 1934 Act
Paralleling the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act exempted state and local gov-
ernment securities from its registration requirements. 4 Justifications
for this exemption included the possible unconstitutionality of requiring
state and local governments to register their securities' 4 9 as well as the
difficulties that such a registration requirement would create for tiny gov-
ernmental units such as villages and school districts.' 0 Yet Congress
144. Indian Motorcycle Co., 283 U.S. at 570. Cf. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox,
277 U.S. 218 (1928) (invalidating state tax on a corporation's sale of gasoline to the United States
government).
145. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). Cf. Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U.S. 501 (1922) (invalidating state tax on income generated from federal land). But cf. Group
No. I Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279 (1931) (upholding federal taxation of income derived from
property that buyer purchased from the federal government).
146. Indian Motorcycle Co., 283 U.S. at 575.
147. Cf. Landis, supra note 81, at 39 (exemption for state and local government securities came
about for unspecified but "obvious political reasons").
148. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
149. See, eg., 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A, supra note 22, item 23 at 898 (statement of drafter James Landis) (describing the constitutional
question as "awfully difficult"); id. at 822 (statement of Rep. Pettengill) (noting that "with all of the
constitutional questions that are involved in this bill, we have got one over the power of Congress to
place any burden upon a State in the marketing of its bonds").
150. See, eg., "Stock Exchange Practices": Hearings Before the Senate Banking and Currency
Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), S. Res, 56, and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. [hereinafter
1934 Act Senate Hearings], reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 22 at 7042
(statement of George B. Gibbons, municipal securities dealer). See also id. at 6840 (statement of
Frank Shaughnessy, president of the San Francisco Stock Exchange); id. at 6991 (statement of Eu-
gene E. Thompson, president of Associated Stock Exchanges); 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note
81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 23 at 535 (statement of Fredric H.
Johnson, president of the San Francisco Curb Exchange).
Another justification offered for the exemption was that, in its absence, state and local govern-
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seriously considered ignoring these justifications-as well as the prece-
dent of the 1933 Act-and requiring registration of these securities. 151
What put the exemption at risk was that state and local government
securities had lost the aura of safety and stability on which their 1933
Act exemption had in large measure been based. While only one member
of Congress had openly questioned their safety in connection with the
1933 Act, 52 the number of doubters had swelled by 1934. For example,
Senator Fletcher, chairman of the Senate Committee considering the
1934 Act, observed that some state and local government securities were
"not worth a dime on the dollar." 15 3 Drafter Thomas Corcoran com-
mented that such securities were "running very unevenly." 154 Addition-
ally, Senator Gore showed concern in questioning a dealer: "Is there any
way that you could vest this administrative agency with the power to
forewarn prospective purchasers that the bond of a certain town is a bad
investment? Is there any red light at all?... Is there any form of protec-
tion or warning that can be afforded?" 1 55
This change in attitude originated with Congress' contemporaneous
consideration of a municipal bankruptcy statute that addressed the finan-
ments would incur greater expenses in marketing their securities. See, ag., 1934 Act Senate Hear-
ings, supra, reprinted in 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 22 at 7526 (statement of
Eugene E. Thompson, president of the Associated Stock Exchanges).
151. Early 1934 Act bills contained no exemption for state and local government securities. See
H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 24 at
6-7 (bill introduced Feb. 10, 1934) (defining the term "security" to exclude United States securities,
thereby exempting them from the entire statute, but providing no such exemption for state and local
government securities); H.R. 7855, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A,
supra note 22, item 25 at 6-7 (bill introduced Feb. 10, 1934) (same); S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 34 at 6-7 (bill introduced Feb. 9,
1934) (same); H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note
22, item 28 at 8-9 (bill introduced March 19, 1934) (defining "exempted securities" to include United
States securities but not state or local government securities).
152. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
153. 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra
note 22, item 23 at 821.
154. Id. at 685.
155. 1934 Act Senate Hearings, supra note 150, reprinted in 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra
note 22, item 22 at 7450. Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury warned that some state
and local government issuers "had better correct their practices." 1934 Act House Hearings, supra
note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 23 at 721 (statement of Tom
K. Smith). A Federal Trade Commission official lamented the "many misfortunes to investors in
municipal securities." See id. at 866 (statement of Robert E. Healy). And the Senate Committee
counsel observed that "the mere fact that an issue is of municipal bonds does not carry with it any
sanctity, so far as its soundness or secureness is concerned." 1934 Act Senate Hearings, supra note
150, reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 22 at 7042.
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cial crisis faced by local governments across the United States. By Janu-
ary 30, 1934, 2019 local governments had defaulted on payments of
interest or principal. 56 Congress feared that without federal interven-
tion these governments soon would be unable to provide even basic fire
and police protection. 5 7 Thus, two weeks before enacting the 1934
Act,' it passed a municipal bankruptcy statute that allowed a local gov-
ernment 5 9 that is "insolvent or unable to meet its debts""l6° to obtain
federal bankruptcy court approval to readjust its debts to creditors, 161
including holders of government securities,1 62 consistent with its ability
to pay.' 63 While the statute required that a majority of the creditors
approve the readjustment, x64 it did not require the local government to
disclose information to creditors that would assist them in deciding
156. See 78 CONG. REC. 7641 (1934) (statement of Sen. Neely). On November 24, 1933, the
number of such local governments was 1650. See id.
157. See S. REP. No. 407, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
158. Congress enacted the 1934 Act on June 6, 1934. See 1934 Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881,
Congress enacted the municipal bankruptcy statute on May 24, 1934. See municipal bankruptcy
statute, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798.
159. The municipal bankruptcy statute applied to "[a]ny municipality or other political subdivi.
sion of any State, including (but not hereby limiting the generality of the foregoing) any county, city,
borough, village, parish, town, or township, unincorporated tax or special assessment district, and
any school, drainage, irrigation, reclamation, levee, sewer, or paving, sanitary, port, improvement, or
other districts." Ch. 345, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798.
160. Id.
161. "Creditors" was defined to "include... all holders of claims, debts, securities, liens or other
interests of whatever character against the [local government] or its property or revenues, including
claims under executory contracts and for future rent, ... and all holders of judgments rendered
against such [local government] but excepting claims for salaries and wages for officers and employ-
ees of the [local government]." Ch. 345, § 80(b), 48 Stat. 798, 799.
162. "Securities" was defined to "include bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness,
either secured or unsecured, and certificates of beneficial interests in property." Id.
163. The municipal bankruptcy statute provided:
[a] plan of readjustment ... (1) shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of
creditors generally, or any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through the issuance
of new securities of any character or otherwise; and (2) may contain such other provisions
and agreements, not inconsistent with this chapter, as the parties may desire.
Id.
164. Creditors were required to give their approval at two points. First, the bankruptcy court
had to receive a proposed plan of readjustment that had been accepted by creditors holding at least
51% of the claims (at least 31% for drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and levee districts). Ch. 345,
§ 80(a), 48 Stat. 798, 799. Second, once the judge had approved the plan, confirmation required
acceptance by creditors holding 66% of the allowed claims. Ch. 345, § 80(d), 48 Stat, 798, 801. The
language setting forth the 66% requirement also appears to impose a 75% requirement, the applica-
tion of which is not clear. See id. Moreover, acceptance was not required for any creditor or class
of creditors neither affected nor compensated in full by the plan. See id.
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whether to approve. 65 In addition, a plan that the court and a majority
of creditors approved bound every creditor, whether approving or disap-
proving. 66 No doubt for these reasons, the statute was described as "a
loophole in the legal background of municipal securities." '167
Proponents of the 1934 Act explicitly invoked the municipal bank-
ruptcy statute to explain their reluctance to exempt state and local gov-
ernment securities from the registration requirement. Thus, Senator
Fletcher noted that the need for the municipal bankruptcy statute called
the exemption from registration into question:
Do you think it would be wise to have a blanket exemption [for local
government securities], when there has been passed through the House a
municipal bankruptcy act and I think probably passed the Senate, for us to
say in this bill that we would exempt every municipal bond from the provi-
sions of [this] bill?
.. If they were all in good shape, they wouldn't be asking for this bank-
ruptcy Act, would they?
... I wish they were all in such shape that we could exempt them, every one
of them, from this bill. 168
And drafter Thomas Corcoran made the same connection between bank-
ruptcy and an exemption for state and local government securities: "The
fact that the Senate has already passed a municipal bankruptcy bill, and
there is now pending before your House a municipal bankruptcy bill,
argues that you can no longer put all municipals in the same exempted
grade as [United States] government bonds."' 169
Thus, despite its ultimate enactment of an exemption for state and lo-
cal government securities, the Congress that enacted the 1934 Act re-
garded these securities with skepticism. Behind the skepticism lay cold,
hard reality: local governments were in financial distress and were lobby-
165. This subject was addressed only to the extent that the bankruptcy judge was given discre-
tion to require the local government to "open its books, records, and files to the inspection of any
creditor... during reasonable business hours." Ch. 345, § 80(c)(7), 48 Stat. 798, 800.
166. Ch. 345, § 80(f), 48 Stat. 798, 802.
167. Amendment of Bankruptcy Laws-Bankruptcy of Municipalities: Hearings on S. 1868 and
H.R. 5950 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1934) (state-
ment of Harry B. Wade, League For the Preservation of Municipal Credit) [hereinafter Senate Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy Hearing].
168. 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra
note 22, item 23 at 820-21.
169. Id. at 685. See also 1934 Act Senate Hearings, supra note 150, reprinted in 7 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY A, supra note 22, item 22 at 7414 (committee counsel Pecora) (asking witness arguing for
an exemption for state and local government securities whether this should be "[w]ithout regard as
to whether any issues are in default or not").
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ing successfully for passage of a municipal bankruptcy statute. 170
C. The Consequences for Section 10(b)
The municipal bankruptcy statute also provides the explanation for
why governments were not included as "persons" subject to section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Had it been applicable to local governments, section
10(b) would have interacted frequently with the municipal bankruptcy
statute, since local governments at or near default would be particuarly
prone to charges of misleading investors concerning their finances. 171
This in turn would have triggered a number of consequences Congress
wished to avoid-consequences that evidently outweighed the investor
protection that application of section 10(b) to local governments would
have provided. 17
2
First, section 10(b) would increase the likelihood of default for those
local governments that were already financially unstable. The reason for
this has to do with the nature of section 10(b), which is not a fraud prohi-
bition as such but rather a grant of authority to the SEC to promulgate
anti-fraud rules.'73 Since the character of these as yet unspawned rules
was unknown in 1934, so too were the compliance costs that the rules
would impose on local governments. These costs were probably viewed
with concern, especially in combination with the other threat to financial
stability that section 10(b) presented to local governments on the verge of
default: court orders under section 10(b) that would directly or indi-
rectly interfere with governmental income or assets. 174
170. See 77 CONG. REc. 5474 (1933) (statement of Rep. Kurtz) (acknowledging that the pres-
sure for the municipal bankruptcy statute came not from investors but from local governments); 78
CONG. REc. 7652-53 (1934) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg) (describing cities supporting the munic-
ipal bankruptcy statute). See also supra note 168 and accompanying text. But cf. S. REP. No. 407,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (asserting that the Senate Judiciary Committee is "convinced" that
most creditors of local governments favor enactment of the municipal bankruptcy statute).
171. Cf. 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HiSTORY A,
supra note 22, item 23 at 897 (statement of drafter James Landis) (noting that "[u]nquestionably
there are salesmen who trade in municipal securities... and will not tell the purchasers that they are
in default").
172. With respect to the municipal bankruptcy statute as well, the welfare of local governments
appeared to loom larger for Congress than did the welfare of investors. See supra notes 165-67 and
accompanying text.
173. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 3. See also Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. Ray. 385 (1990) (showing that § 10(b) was
intended to vest more authority in the SEC than is today assumed).
174. Such orders were, on the other hand, expressly prohibited under the municipal bankruptcy
statute "unless the plan of readjustment so provides." Ch. 345, § 80(c) (11), 48 Stat. 798, 801.
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Second, section 10(b) might thwart the speedy financial recovery of
local governments that the municipal bankruptcy statute was intended to
promote. 175 Recovery would be delayed or prevented if local govern-
ments were required to expend resources complying with administrative
rules or court orders.
Third, section 10(b) would have raised constitutional problems that
the municipal bankruptcy statute would only have aggravated. Section
10(b)'s constitutional vulnerability was rooted in its delegation of power
to an administrative agency.1 76 Extended to include authority over local
governments, such power would have been at least as great a threat to
local sovereignty as the registration requirement for local government
securities that Congress had rejected as probably unconstitutional. 177
Moreover, the municipal bankruptcy statute itself threatened local sover-
eignty to the extent it accorded the federal bankruptcy courts authority
over local governments. 178 Congress recognized that the municipal
bankruptcy statute was vulnerable on this basis, 179 a suspicion that two
years later proved prescient. 8 Thus in 1934 Congress must have been
aware that, as applied to local goverments, section 10(b) and the munici-
pal bankruptcy statute had parallel constitutional weaknesses such that
the odds were good that one or both would be struck down in any case in
which both were implicated.
Finally, section 10(b) would have imposed compliance costs on solvent
local governments, whose ability to market securities was widely thought
to be imperiled by the very existence of a statute that authorized munici-
pal bankruptcy. 8 Congress may have sought to compensate for the im-
175. See generally S. REP. No. 407, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934).
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 139-41, 149 and accompanying text.
178. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court declared the municipal bankruptcy statute
unconstitutional on this very basis in 1936. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). Congress then enacted an essentially identical statute, Act of Aug.
16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653, which the Supreme Court thereafter upheld. See United
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
179. Representative Wilcox, a sponsor of the municipal bankruptcy statute, frequently addressed
this point. See, eg., House Municipal Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 136, at 23-24 (defending the
statute's constitutionality); Senate Municipal Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 167, at 145 (same).
Moreover, the Senate Report captioned a section as follows: 'THIS BILL DOES NOT EXTEND
THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE STATES OR OVER ANY OF THEIR SUBDI-
VISIONS." S. REP. No. 407, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
180. See supra note 178.
181. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 7662 (1934) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg); 77 CONG. REC. 5730
(1933) (statement of Sen. Reed); 77 CONG. REc. 5485-86 (1933) (statement of Rep. Hastings). See
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pact of the municipal bankruptcy statute by shielding all local
governments from the reach of section 10(b).
In sum, if applicable to local governments, section 10(b) would have
generated numerous undesirable effects. It would have threatened the
financial stability of local governments near default, while delaying the
recovery of those that had defaulted already. Additionally, section 10(b)
might well have been declared unconstitutional as applied to local gov-
ernments, particularly if the municipal bankruptcy statute were also
involved.
Congress did not display indifference to these effects by failing to re-
consider the reach of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act in light of the poor
financial condition of local governments that surfaced in 1934. Instead,
Congress no doubt understood section 17(a) to pose significantly less of a
threat to local sovereignty than did section 10(b). Indeed, section 17(a)
simply prohibited fraud, and did not, as did section 10(b), vest an admin-
istrative agency with wide discretion. 82 Moreover, after its extensive
consideration of the definition of "person" in 1933,183 legislators may
have been unwilling to treat the matter as an open question the very next
year.
In short, Congress acted reasonably as well as deliberately in excluding
local governments from the reach of section 10(b). If there is any basis
for applying section 10(b) to local governments, it must lie with the 1975
amendments.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE
1975 AMENDMENTS
In 1975, in the course of the "'most substantial and significant revi-
sion of this country's Federal securities laws since ... 1934,' ,184 Con-
also 1934 Act House Hearings, supra note 81, reprinted in 9 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY A, supra note
22, item 23 at 823 (statement of Rep. Pettengill) (expressing his opposition to the municipal bank-
ruptcy statute on this basis). But cf. 78 CONG. REc. 7742-43 (1934) (statement of Sen. Robinson)
(arguing that there would be no harm to solvent local governments in the long run).
182. For the text of § 17(a), see supra note 27. Whether the application of § 17(a) to local
governments would have withstood constitutional challenge in the 1930s is nonetheless an open
question. Cf. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936)
(holding the municipal bankruptcy statute unconstitutional on the basis of numerous cited authori-
ties). Today, in the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), the application of § 17(a) to local governments would appear to be free from constitutional
difficulty.
183. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
184. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-385 (1983) (quoting SecuritiesActs
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gress revisited the issue of the regulation of state and local government
securities.185 Testimony in congressional hearings reported abuses by
brokers and dealers in these securities,18 6 who were largely unregulated
by the 1934 Act. 87 The 1975 amendments required these professionals
not only to register with the SEC""8 but also to abide by rules promul-
gated by the newly created Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.1
89
While leaving untouched the registration exemptions for state and local
government securities,"9 the 1975 amendments changed the statutory
status of the governments themselves by adding to the definition of "per-
son" a "government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrument of a
government."' 9 ' This revision attracted attention. Although supported
by the Senate,'92 it was not incorporated in the bill that originally passed
the House. 193 A conference committee resolved the conflict by choosing
the Senate version, which both houses then adopted.
1 94
According to a number of lower federal courts and commentators, lo-
cal governments became appropriate rule lOb-5 defendants once Con-
gress revised the 1934 Act's definition of "person."1 95 In their view, the
Amendments of 1975: Hearings on S: 249 before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975)).
185. Other topics addressed by Congress in 1975 included the national market system, the na-
tional system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions, and self-regulatory organiza-
tions. See generally Donald M. Harrison, Note, Legislation: Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 29
OKLA. L. REV. 462 (1976).
186. See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Report], re-
printed in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note 22, item 158 at 2717.
187. These brokers and dealers were, however, potential § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 defendants prior
to 1975. For pre-1975 cases against brokers and dealers, see infra notes 224-28 and accompanying
text.
188. Brokers and dealers in state and local government securities were designated "municipal
securities dealers." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30) (1988). As such, they were required to register with the
SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a) (1) (1988).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b) (2) (1988). See generally Roswell C. Dikeman, Municipal Securi-
ties Rulemaking Board: A New Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. REV. 903 (1976).
190. For a description of these exemptions, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
191. Section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act now provides that "the term 'person' means a natural per-
son, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1988). Prior to 1975, governments were not "persons" under the 1934 Act. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
192. See 121 CONG. REC. 10,711 (1975), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note 22,
item 159 at 2928.
193. See 121 CONG. REc. 11,748 (1975), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note 22,
item 160 at 2983.
194. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY B, supra note 22, item 162 at 3041.
195. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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legislative history need not be considered because of the straightforward
statutory language: section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 apply to any "person"
and a "person" now includes a government.1 96
This textual approach has serious flaws. It ignores the importance of
legislative history to analyses of the federal securities laws and the liabil-
ity of local governments under federal statutes, 197 and it produces a re-
sult squarely at odds with Congress' intent. Indeed, the legislative
history of the 1975 amendments is altogether inconsistent with the crea-
tion of liability for local governments. In the words of the Senate Re-
port: "The bill assures that access of state and local governments to the
capital markets will not be regulated in ways not now permitted under the
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." 198 This pronouncement
appeared in a section entitled "REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
PROFESSIONALS-NOT ISSUERS."
199
Further evidence of Congress' choice not to regulate local govern-
ments lies in its efforts to assure those governments that regulation would
not occur accidentally. The anxiety of local governments in this regard
was of sufficient magnitude to warrant mention in the Senate Report:
"While conceding that nothing in the legislation contemplates direct reg-
ulation of issuers or the registration of their securities, municipal issuers
have nevertheless expressed concern over the possibility of indirect re-
quirements.... 2o The anxiety apparently also struck Congress as rea-
sonable under the circumstances, prompting the addition of two
provisions to the 1934 Act: sections 3(d)20 1 and 15B(d).2°2 Section 3(d)
was designed to prevent regulation of a state or local government that
traded in its own securities.20 3 Section 15B(d) was intended to insure
196. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
197. In federal securities cases, the legislative history from the 1930s is important because of the
nature of the statutory text, the high caliber of the drafters who testified at the hearings, and the
depoliticization of the enactment process that resulted from the economic crisis of the early 1930s.
See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text. Clearly the first factor supports the importance of the
history of the 1975 amendments as well, since those amendments merely plugged holes in an already
well-established statutory design. The history of the 1975 amendments is likewise important for all
the reasons that legislative history is central to analysis of the liability of local governments under
federal statutes. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
198. 1975 Senate Report, supra note 186, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note
22, item 158 at 2719 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 2718.
200. Id.
201. Section 3(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(d) (1988) [hereinafter § 3(d)].
202. Section 15B(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1988) [hereinafter § 15B(d)].
203. Section 3(d) provides: "No issuer of municipal securities or officer or employee thereof
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that state or local government issuers were not subject to the newly cre-
ated Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.2° 4 As Senator Williams, a
sponsor of section 15B(d), explained on the floor, the section "would sim-
ply clarify... that the bill is not intended to tamper in any way with
prerogatives of State and local governments in their sale of securities. '20 5
Congress' attempt to purge the 1975 amendments of even indirect reg-
ulatory effects on local governments is incompatible with an intent to
subject these governments to the daunting prospect of private litigation
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. ° 6 It strains credulity to suppose that
Congress would precipitate a change of this nature without comment
while simultaneously insisting that the legislation did not affect local gov-
ernments even indirectly.
Proponents of a textual approach might respond that Congress reason-
ably could have assumed that as newly minted statutory "persons," local
governments automatically would become subject to section 10(b) and
hence any legislative history to the contrary should not be taken at face
value. Indeed, how was Congress to know that legislative history was
crucial? Most of the Supreme Court's securities decisions emphasizing
legislative history's importance were not on the books at the time Con-
gress enacted the 1975 amendments.20 7 Nor did those books contain the
Court's 1978 antitrust and civil rights decisions on the liability of local
governments in which the legislative history was accorded great
acting in the course of his official duties as such shall be deemed to be a 'broker,' 'dealer,' or 'munici-
pal securities dealer' solely by reason of buying, selling, or effecting transactions in the issuer's secur-
ities." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(d) (1988).
204. Section 15(B)(d) provides:
(1) Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this chapter, by rule or
regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through
a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the Com-
mission or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any application,
report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such
securities.
(2) The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer of municipal
securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities broker or municipal
securities dealer or otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser or a prospective
purchaser of such securities any application, report, document, or information with
respect to such issuer...
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1988).
205. 121 CONG. REc. 10,736 (1975), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY B, supra note 22,
item 159 at 2953.
206. If § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 were not applicable, local governments would face virtually no
threat of private securities fraud litigation. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 47-85 and accompanying text.
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weight.2 °8
But Congress in fact did know that legislative history was crucial. The
importance of legislative history to local government liability had been
established in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, 2 09 one of the landmark civil rights
decisions of the twentieth century. The Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 1983 in Monroe made possible most of the litigation under that
statute of the last thirty years.21 0 The Monroe Court also held, however,
that local governments were not "persons" subject to liability under sec-
tion 1983.211 This holding was not based on statutory language, which
simply imposed liability on any "person"-a term not otherwise de-
fined-who acted "under color of" state law.21 2 Instead, the Court re-
jected local government liability entirely on the basis of the legislative
history, despite the fact that nothing in the legislative history was di-
rectly on point. The evidence that persuaded the Court was largely infer-
ential. Congress had rejected the Sherman Amendment, which would
have made cities liable for specified acts of violence.21 3 From this the
Court inferred an intent to reject local government liability in all circum-
stances,214 notwithstanding a definition of "person" in the contempora-
neous Dictionary Act215 that militated in favor of liability.216 Monroe
thus showed that local government liability under federal statutes must
be based on clear evidence of congressional intent, gathered from both
textual and nontextual sources.217
208. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
209. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
210. In Monroe, the Court held that § 1983 encompassed both official government actions and
the unauthorized actions of individual state defendants that violated state law. See id. at 183-87.
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.3 (1989).
211. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187-91. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Court reversed the holding of Monroe that rejected local government liability under
§ 1983.
212. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
213. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-90.
214. Id. at 191.
215. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
216. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91.
217. The teaching of Monroe was confirmed by lower court antitrust cases on the books at the
time Congress considered the 1975 amendments. Various factors suggested strongly that local gov-
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The text and the history of the 1975 amendments, then, seem very
much at odds. The text, considered alone, appears to authorize fraud
actions against local governments: a government is deemed a "person"
and any "person" is subject to section 10(b). The legislative history runs
counter to this interpretation, however, by stressing that the fraud liabil-
ity of local governments was to remain unchanged. Hence the question
arises whether text and history can be reconciled or whether a choice
must be made between them.
IV. SECTION 10(b) AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AFTER THE 1975
AMENDMENTS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
This Article proposes a reconciliation of the text and history of the
1975 amendments, attempting to explain why Congress would choose
both to redefine "person" to include a government but not to make local
governments liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Together, these
choices furthered the central purpose of the 1975 amendments: the regu-
lation of professionals dealing in state and local government securities.2" 8
The reclassification of governments as "persons" provided a firmer foun-
dation for claims against these professionals. As a "person," a govern-
ment could be cited as the professional's uncharged conspirator,21 9
thereby supplying the conspiracy with its necessary second partici-
ernments were appropriate defendants under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The statu-
tory text created a cause of action against any "person," see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), and "person" was
defined in highly general terms that easily could have encompassed local governments. See 15
U.S.C. § 7 (1988). An earlier Supreme Court decision had held a city to be a "person" under the
antitrust laws and for that reason a proper antitrust plaintiff. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). Nonetheless, at the time Congress considered
the 1975 amendments, lower courts divided over how to harmonize the liability of local governments
with the antitrust immunity of states. See Ellen J. Tchorni, Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal
Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?,
65 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1561-75 (1977) (collecting the lower courts' various approaches). Underlying
this division was broad agreement that local government antitrust liability could not be accepted or
rejected solely on the basis of statutory language. Id. at 1561-75. These lower court decisions made
it clear that for federal statutory liability to attach to local governments, Congress would have to do
more than adopt a broad definition of "person."
218. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
219. For discussions of conspiracy under the federal securities laws, see William H. Kuehnle,
Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling
Person, and Agency: Common Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 343-48
(1988); David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-45
(1972).
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pant.220 Likewise, as a "person" a government could be cited as the un-
charged principal perpetrator of the violation that the professional aided
and abetted.221 In this way, the government would supply the aiding and
abetting charge with the necessary primary violation.222 Congress would
have regarded the foregoing strategy223 as obvious and worthwhile in
light of (1) the then existing rule lOb-5 cases involving professionals in
local government securities, as well as (2) the difficulty in citing a govern-
ment as an uncharged conspirator or primary violator if a government
were not a 1934 Act "person."
A. Pre-1975 Rule 10b-5 Caselaw
In considering the regulation of professionals who dealt in local gov-
ernment securities, Congress would have found noteworthy two aspects
of the eleven reported federal cases then on the books in which such
professionals had been charged with fraud. 224 First, in most of the cases,
the professionals were charged either with conspiracy to violate rule
lOb-5225 or with aiding and abetting the rule lOb-5 violations of others.226
Second, in most of them, local governments or local government officials
220. For the proposition that a conspiracy requires two participants, see Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934). See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (two-person requirement under federal
conspiracy statute).
221. For discussions of aiding and abetting under the federal securities laws, see Alan R. Brom-
berg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding& Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB, L.
REV. 637 (1988); Kuenhle, supra note 219, at 320-43; Ruder, supra note 219, at 620-45.
222. For the proposition that an aiding and abetting charge requires a primary violation by a
separate party, see Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 221, at 662, 668-70. See also Kuenhle, supra
note 219, at 322.
223. The strategy probably embraced state governments as well. As long as the state govern-
ment was not subject to liability, it arguably could be named as an uncharged conspirator or as an
uncharged primary violator consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24 (1980) (allowing a state official to be named as an uncharged conspirator under § 1983).
224. See SEC v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir.
1976); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974); SEC v. Charles A.
Morris & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp.
798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp.
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.
Ky. 1960), rev'd sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962);
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 131
F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Citizens' Casualty Co. v. Shields, [1954 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,683 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1954).
225. See Shapiro, 279 F. Supp. at 800; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. at 24;
Thiele, 131 F. Supp. at 418; Greenwich Say. Bank, 131 F. Supp. at 369; Citizens Casualty Co., [1954
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,683 at 92,057.
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were either named as defendants227 or if not, were otherwise implicated
in the transactions.228
B. Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting
Under the 1934 Act as originally enacted, there was serious difficulty
in charging a securities professional with conspiring with or aiding and
abetting a government to violate rule lOb-5. The difficulty resulted from
the fact that while a professional was a statutory "person" with the legal
capacity to commit a substantive 1934 Act violation, a government was
not.2 29 Thus, the conspiracy or aiding and abetting charge against the
professional might fail on the ground that his government confederate
was not a "person" recognized by the 1934 Act.
To be sure, as a general rule, two people can be convicted of conspir-
acy if only one of them has the legal capacity to commit the underlying
substantive offense. Thus, in United States v. Holte,23° the Supreme
Court approved the conviction of a government employee and a private
party for conspiring to commit a substantive offense that only the gov-
ernment employee had the legal capacity to commit.231 Application of
226. See Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. at 507; R.J Allen & Assocs., Ina, 386 F. Supp. at 877;
Charles A. Morris & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. at 1335.
227. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (defendants include chairman of Bellevue, Nebraska Bridge Commission); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (same); Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (same); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (same); Citizens Casualty Co. v. Shields, [1954 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,683 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1954) (same); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (defend-
ants include Bellevue, Nebraska Bridge Commission and its members). None of these cases indi-
cated that the local government official acted in other than his official capacity. In his official
capacity, a local government official is indistinguishable from the local government itself. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
No challenge was made in these cases to the naming of local governments and local government
officials as defendants. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
228. See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960)
(implicating West Beuchel, Ky.), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). See also SEC v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky.
1975) (implicating Covington, Ky.), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1976). The City of Covington
later was named as a defendant in a separate action growing out of the same transaction. See Brown
v. City of Covington, 805 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1986).
229. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
230. 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
231. Id. at 145. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224, 225 n.59
(1940) (reaffirming the general rule); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (upholding
charge that bankrupts and nonbankrupts conspired to violate a bankruptcy act provision pertaining
only to bankrupts). Cf. United States v. Giordano, 489 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1973) (a depositor can
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the general rule assumes, however, that no affirmative statutory policy
prevents the offense in question from subsuming in an appropriate case
those not goverment employees. When Congress excludes a particular
class of persons from a provision for policy reasons, the general rule gives
way. In such a case, the member of the excluded class is immune from
liability not only for the substantive offense, but also for conspiracy to
commit that offense.232 Moreover, in all likelihood she cannot be cited as
an uncharged conspirator or as an uncharged primary violator to provide
a foundation for the liablity of another.233 While citing her in these ways
would facilitate statutory enforcement, it would to some extent under-
mine her immunity, since her guilt or innocence would be a focus of the
trial even though she was not actually charged.234
Courts have long struggled to reconcile these competing considera-
tions. In Gebardi v. United States,235 the Supreme Court tilted in favor
of safeguarding the excluded person's statutory immunity from liability.
Gebardi involved the conviction under the Mann Act2 36 of a man and a
woman for conspiracy to transport the woman across state lines for pur-
poses of prostitution. Under the Mann Act, the man, but not the wo-
man, had the legal capacity to commit the substantive offense.237
Observing that the woman had been excluded from the statute for policy
reasons, the Court concluded: "It would contravene that policy to hold
that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the con-
spiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers. '2 38
Accordingly, the Court held not only that the woman was herself im-
mune from a charge of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act, but also that
she could not be cited as the man's conspirator for purposes of sustaining
his conspiracy conviction. 239 The Court reversed not only her convic-
be liable for aiding and abetting a violation by a bank officer that only the bank officer has the legal
capacity to commit).
232. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 239-43, 245 and accompanying text. But cf supra note 244.
234. Cf. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 986 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Cole-
man, Ainsworth, Roney, and Hill, JJ., dissenting) (noting that when a judge, immune from liability,
is named as an uncharged conspirator under § 1983, his behavior is on trial even if he is not actually
named as a defendant), aff'd sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
235. 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
236. Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988) [hereinafter Mann Act].
237. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118.
238. Id. at 123.
239. Id. It is true, of course, that in Gebardi the woman was a member of the class that the
Mann Act was designed to protect. See id. at 116. Yet courts have applied the principle of this case
more broadly. Thus, in United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd sub
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tion, but his as well.24 0
A variant of this issue arose repeatedly under section 1983 prior to
enactment of the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court
regarded section 1983 as inapplicable to states both because Congress so
intended 241 and because the Eleventh Amendment so required. 24 2  But
could the state (or its official acting in his official capacity) nonetheless be
cited as the uncharged conspirator of a private individual? If so, the state
would both give the conspiracy its necessary second participant and also
satisfy section 1983's "under color of state law" requirement.243 In 1975,
the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue lay five years in the future,2'
and in line with Gebardi, lower courts adopted the view that a state or
state official could not be treated as a private individual's uncharged
conspirator.245
In short, in 1975, a claim of conspiracy or aiding and abetting a viola-
nom. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991), the court observed that "[n]othing in
Gebardi indicates that only 'protected' persons are exempted from conspiracy charges." Id. at 118.
Accordingly, the court held that foreign officials could not be charged with conspiracy to violate the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act because they had been omitted from that Act's substantive provisions
for policy reasons. See id. at 120. Similarly, in United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1973), the court relied on Gebardi to overturn convictions of a former government lawyer and his
client for conspiracy to violate a federal conflict-of-interest statute that applied only to the lawyer.
The court rejected the argument that Gebardi did not apply because the client had "culpable intent"
and was therefore not among those the statute was intended to protect. See id. at 1120.
240. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123. See also Nasser, 476 F.2d at 1120 (rejecting conspiracy convic-
tions of lawyer and client because, for reasons of statutory policy, client was not covered by the
underlying substantive offense); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 1941) (rejecting
conspiracy between purchaser and seller of narcotics because purchaser was excluded from the un-
derlying substantive offense for policy reasons). Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976)
(county, excluded from liability under § 1983 for policy reasons, could not be brought into federal
court pursuant to pendent-party jurisdiction); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381-82 (2d Cir.
1987) (rejecting conviction for aiding and abetting because defendant had been excluded for policy
reasons from the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1021 (1988).
241. Since, in the wake of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), local governments were not
"persons" under § 1983, it followed afortiori that states were not "persons" either. See Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976). The Supreme Court has recently held that states and state
officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dept. Of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62-71 (1989).
242. See, eg., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
243. For the text of § 1983, see supra note 212. For a discussion of the "under color of state
law" requirement, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 210, § 8.3.
244. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), the Court upheld the conviction of a private
individual for conspiring with an uncharged state official to violate § 1983.
245. See, e-g., Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975); Sykes v. California, 497
F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1974); Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tion of federal law was vulnerable to dismissal when the defendant's con-
federate-though uncharged-was himself excluded from the underlying
substantive offense for reasons of statutory policy. 246 Hence under the
1934 Act as originally enacted, a local government, excluded from sec-
tion 10(b) for reasons of policy,2 4 7 was an inappropriate uncharged con-
spirator of a securities professional as well as an inappropriate uncharged
perpetrator of the primary violation that the professional allegedly aided
and abetted. Yet prospects for treating the local government as an un-
charged confederate would have improved immeasurably if Congress re-
classified the government as a "person," even if the government's
immunity remained intact. By turning governments into "persons," the
1975 amendments accomplished precisely that result.
C. Counter Arguments
Three arguments run counter to the conclusion that local governments
are subject to section 10(b) only to the extent that they may be cited as
uncharged conspirators and uncharged primary violators: (1) because
local governments sometimes were defendants in pre-1975 federal securi-
ties cases, their reclassification as "persons" may have been intended to
provide a foundation for governmental liability; (2) in the interests of
harmony between the 1933 and 1934 Acts,248 local governments should
have the same status under section 10(b) as under section 17(a); and (3)
had Congress intended local governments to be cited as uncharged con-
spirators and uncharged primary violators, it would have said so
expressly.
1. Local Government Defendants in Pre-1975 Caselaw
Local governments sometimes were defendants in pre-1975 federal se-
curities cases. 249 It does not follow, however, that in 1975 Congress in-
tended to provide a foundation for their liability. None of the pre-1975
actions against a local government appears to have advanced beyond the
246. The claim also would be at risk today. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. But cf.
supra note 244.
247. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
248. It is sometimes said that "the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be construed harmoniously be-
cause they 'constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transac-
tions in securities.'" Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1989) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)).
249. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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preliminary motion stage,25 and in none did the opinion consider the
argument that local governments were inappropriate defendants.251
These cases, therefore, did not seriously invite Congress to consider sub-
jecting local governments to liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
In any event, the Senate Report on the 1975 amendments states categori-
cally that the fraud liability of local governments would remain
unchanged.252
2. Harmony Between the 1933 and 1934 Acts
Subjecting local governments to liability under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 would not promote harmony between the 1933 and 1934 Acts. To
be sure, as "persons" under the 1933 Act, local governments are subject
to liability under section 17(a), because nothing in the legislative history
contradicts the statutory language. Yet if local governments were also
made subject to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, a substantial discrepancy
between the two acts would result: the 1934 Act would allow private
fraud actions against local governments, whereas the 1933 Act would
not. Indeed, while there is no doubt about the existence of a private
action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, 253 a private action under sec-
tion 17(a) is now widely rejected.254 Thus, it is specious to argue that
giving uniform effect to the two definitions of "person" would produce
harmony between the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
3. Congress's Silence Concerning Conspiracy
Finally, it is certainly true that the legislative history of the 1975
amendments contains no outright statement authorizing the citing of lo-
cal governments as uncharged conspirators and uncharged primary vio-
lators. Yet it would have been entirely reasonable for Congress to
suppose that the reclassification of governments as "persons" automati-
cally would permit them to be cited in this fashion. Moreover, explicit-
ness also may have been politically inexpedient. Local governments
appear to have lobbied hard in Congress to avoid even indirect regulation
under the 1975 amendments.255 Although treatment as uncharged con-
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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spirators and uncharged primary violators was not regulation as such, it
was not something about which local governments would in all likeli-
hood have waxed enthusiastic.
CONCLUSION
Local governments are immune from liability under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. In 1934, local governments were not among those "persons"
to whom section 10(b) applied. This exclusion was intentional, designed
to prevent interaction between section 10(b) and the contemporaneously
enacted municipal bankruptcy statute. When Congress amended the
1934 Act in 1975, local governments remained immune from fraud liabil-
ity, notwithstanding their reclassification as "persons." Congress in-
tended the 1975 amendments to regulate professionals dealing in state
and local government securities, and thus reclassified governments as
"persons" merely to facilitate suits against these professionals.
A textual approach has obvious merits and is often an appropriate
method of statutory construction in some areas of the law. In the areas
of federal securities regulation and local government liability under fed-
eral statutes, however, it produces results at odds with congressional in-
tent. Only by adopting a comprehensive and historical approach in these
areas can the courts accomplish the results that Congress has chosen.
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